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ABSTRACT
Debt-equity swaps have been heralded as a market solution which
can bring about a reduction of the burden of external debt which
afflicts many Third World countries. This paper examines the impact
of a debt conversion program on the domestic economy of the debtor
country, focusing on the Brazilian case. In particular, this work
retraces the emergence of debt-f or-equity swaps, the secondary market
for LDC debt, and the perspectives for an increase of debt conversions
in Brazil. The domestic effects studied here relate to the impact on
the Brazilian stock market, the question of denationalization, as well
as the effects on the domestic rate of inflation, interest rates, and
exchange rates.

THE IMPACT OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY:
THE BRAZILIAN CASE
I. INTRODUCTION
The motivation behind the present work relates to the analysis of
a recent market solution proposed as an alternative or as a complemen-
tary strategy to deal with the Third World debt problem. This alterna-
tive is the so-called debt-f or-equity swap, i.e., the conversion of
external debt into domestic claims to be used for investment purposes.
Debt-equity swaps have been heralded as an innovative approach which
can bring about a reduction in the absolute level of external debt for
Third World countries. This paper analyzes the viability of such a
program in the Brazilian case.
In the following section of this paper, the international context
in which debt conversion made its appearance is presented. In addi-
tion, we describe the debt conversion scheme in more detail as well as
the functioning of the secondary market for Less Developed Countries'
debt. Finally, in this section reference is made to some of the
advantages and disadvantages involved in the conversion of the debt.
The third section discusses the Brazilian experience with debt
conversion prior to the announcement of a broad program in November
1987. This discussion includes the experience before 1982, the in-
creasing volume of conversions between 1982 and 1984, and the setbacks
from 1984 onward.
In the fourth section, some institutional and legal aspects of the
new Brazilian program of debt conversion are discussed. In addition,
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in this section we examine eventual domestic impacts of the new pro-
gram of debt conversion.
Finally, based upon the Brazilian experience, the debt conversion
approach is evaluated as an alternative or a complementary strategy
for the solution of the debt problem.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF DEBT-FOR-EQUITY SWAPS
The International Context in the Early 1980s
When Mexico declared its moratorium in August 1982, the degree of
tension that had built up in the international financial system since
the late 1970s was high enough for the recognition of a generalized
debt crisis. Academic and market analysts, however, have been unable
to reach a consensus with respect to the factors leading to the debt
crisis. One interpretation suggests that the crisis in the inter-
national financial system in the early 1980s was a by-product of inter-
national commodity shocks interacting with the erratic behavior of the
international monetary system, as well as of the macroeconomic policies
adopted by the developed countries, in particular the U.S., in their
effort to reign on high and rising inflation rates.
At the conference on International Debt and Central Banking in
October 1983, most of the debt experts agreed that the causes of the
debt crisis were beyond the traditional explanation of the oil shocks
(1974 and 1979). Likewise, there was agreement upon the idea that
borrowing countries were not solely responsible for the international
debt problems. The policies of the developed countries, which
generated acute rises in the interest rates, coupled with increased
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protectionism and fluctuations in the exchange rates, were thought to
have played an important role in the emergence of the debt problem.
For an understanding of the debt crisis, as well as of the imagi-
native solutions that have been proposed by the international finan-
cial community, an examination of the evolution of the composition of
financial flows in the last two decades is required. After 1973, an
increasing reliance on capital flows from private banks not only for
trade financing purposes, but mainly for development and balance of
payments adjustment, left the developing countries in a vulnerable
situation regarding the evolution of international interest rates and
inflation, throughout the 1970s and up to the present. The composi-
tion of the international capital flows from developed to developing
countries, provided in Chart I, shows the increasing participation of
commercial bank lending, from 19 percent in 1970 to 25 percent and 28
percent in 1975 and 1982, respectively. A closer analysis of the major
borrowers, such as Brazil, provides a much worse picture: the par-
ticipation of debt from commercial banks rose from 42.0 percent in
1970 to 80.5 percent in 1978 (see Table II-l). This increased reliance
on commercial bank funds, as stated above, helped to trigger the inter-
2
national debt problems of the early 1980s. The 1980s arrived with the
major commercial banks presenting a high degree of exposure to develop-
ing country loans. As is shown in Table II-2, the exposure of the
largest nine American banks with respect to Eastern Europe and nonoil
LDCs increased from 188.2 percent in 1977 to 235.2 percent of their
3
capital in 1982. The total exposure for the same group of banks and
borrowers was around US $68,194 billion. As the data in Table II-2
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show, the banks' exposure profile between the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s did not change abruptly. A radical change, how-
ever, took place in the way which the banks reassessed their existing
exposure problem.
After the Poland crisis in 1981, Mexico's moratorium in 1982 and
the Malvinas (Falklands) War in 1982, the same levels of exposure that
until then represented a profitability indicator, had suddenly turned
into a risk measure. These liquidity crises casted serious doubts on
the ability of major borrowers to service their debts. This new atti-
tude brought about the idea that a country with a high level of foreign
indebtedness had to be avoided by prospective lenders. Consequently,
very few nations had access to new voluntary lending in the inter-
4
national financial markets. As a corollary, most LDCs had to face
serious liquidity constraints from 1982 onwards. New flows of capital
to the LDCs were made conditional to domestic adjustment programs
under monitoring of the IMF.
Although the IMF's response to the international crisis was rela-
tively prompt, in the sense of pressuring the international banks to
lend conditionally, its policies were revealed to be not very effec-
tive. 5
Since 1982 several alternatives have been proposed for the solu-
tion of the debt problem, but little progress has been made. However,
with the persistency of the liquidity and solvency problems, at least
the creditor parties have become more flexible in sharing part of the
losses. In this context, the debt conversion and capitalization pro-
posal has emerged as an alternative to the management of debt problem.
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This proposal has generated the interest of international banks, some
concerns among major debtors and an overall feeling of skepticism among
international analysts.
Debt-f or-Equity Swaps
The debt for equity swap operation emerged during the liquidity
crisis of 1982, when the commercial banks reassessed their degrees of
exposure, putting a lid on new spontaneous lending to Less Developing
Countries (LDCs). The idea behind such an operation is to convert
international debt denominated in foreign currency, usually U.S.
dollars, into domestic claims, which are to be used for investment
purposes.
In simple terms, the deal involves three parties: buyers, sellers
and local institutions. The buyer, say, an American investor, pur-
chases the debt at a discount from the original holder of the loan,
e.g., a commercial bank. Then the investor sells the dollar denomi-
nated debt back to the local government, receiving assets denominated
in domestic currency. However, the local government does not pay the
face value of the debt, it rather earns a discount. At the end, the
investor will have received a "subsidy" for investing in that specific
country, which equals the original discount minus the charges imposed
by the local government.
The demand for equity swaps of a specific country might come either
from its residents with access to foreign exchange, or from foreigners
willing to invest in that country. The size of the original discount,
the local charges, the expected movement of the exchange rate, and
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especially the country's economic and political prospects, should af-
fect the demand for debt-equity swaps.
The Secondary Market for LDC Debt
At the core of operations such as debt-equity swaps or more gener-
ally debt conversions is the development of a secondary market for LDC
debt. Centered in London and New York, the secondary market has played
a role in helping to provide liquidity for commercial banks' portfolios.
Among the few brokers and intermediaries actively trading in the
very beginning of this market, back in 1983, was a joint venture be-
tween the European Inter American Finance Corporation (EURINAM) and the
Q
U.K. merchant bank Singer & Friedlander. Their deals helped to bring
the attention of bankers and the international press to the incipient
secondary market of LDC debt. The initial sellers were mainly the
highly provisioned European and Middle-Eastern banks, i.e., banks with
high loan-loss reserves, as well as the regional U.S. commercial banks,
whose intention was to get such LDC loans off their books.
Although the market remains small, it has changed rapidly during
its short existence. It was initially quite limited, and quotations
on the discounted debt have been treated as artificial due to the thin-
ness of the market. In the last two years, however, the market has
become better organized, participation has widened, and the transac-
tions have been diversified. The participation is estimated to have
increased from US $2 billion in 1984 to US $8 billion in 1987 (see
Chart II). In relation to Latin America's external debt of US $380
billion, it represents 2.1 percent, which shows how embryonic the
market remains.
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New interpretations of accounting rules and changes in the banking
regulation in the U.S. have contributed to the development of the
9
market. A bank taking a loss on a cashing or swap of a LDC loan would
not be required to reduce the book value of the remaining loans to that
specific country, provided the bank previously split up its loans into
separate portfolios. However, the accounting profession in the U.S.
has not reached an agreement as to how to deal with this "contamination
problem.
"
The inflection point for this secondary market may have occurred
in May 1987, when John Reed—Citicorp's chairman—announced the massive
provision of US $3 billion to face the potential losses against LDC
debt. This movement, followed by other money center banks, marked
the beginning of direct participation in the market by U.S. commercial
12banks as suppliers of loans. The impact of such announcement was
fully reflected in the swing down of quotation prices. Countries like
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, whose debt at market prices in the
fourth quarter of 1986 were at 65?, 76?, and 55.5? to the dollar,
respectively, had their prices quoted at 35.5?, 38? and 49? in the
fourth quarter of 1987 (see Table II-3).
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages
The development of an active secondary market in debt instruments
of LDCs offers advantages for all sides: lenders, borrowers and
investors. The commercial banks may be able to transform their pre-
vious bad credits, kept at the artificial face value in their books,
into a realistic and potential source of profits to be earned. The
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foreign investor, wishing to buy assets or to recapitalize its own
investments in a debtor country, obtains local currency at a discount.
Finally, the debtor country can take advantage of this market
through a conversion scheme in several ways. First, by either reduc-
ing the stock or the rate of growth of its external debt. Second, by
attracting flight capital as well as attracting foreign direct invest-
ment. Third, by transforming a situation of net capital exporter
through the service of its debt into a situation of less certain out-
flows associated with private direct investment, through repatriation
of profits.
However, such an appealing device has also potential disadvantages.
In the following sections of the paper, some of the disadvantages will
be discussed in the context of the Brazilian experience. For the time
being, it suffices to mention three of the major disadvantages for the
LDCs : the denationalization impact; the monetary impact; and the pres-
sure upon the domestic public deficit.
Despite the potential disadvantages, the Latin American governments
appear, with some degree of caution, to have begun to endorse the idea.
Until 1987, Chile and Mexico were the mainstays of the debt-equity swap
market, with a total of around US $3 billion of debt retired between
them. Recently, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have announced new
programs. Outside Latin America, other programs are unfolding. The
Philippines have the most advanced, and the idea is also gaining
13
momentum in Africa.
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III. THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
Debt Conversions in Brazil up to 1984
The Brazilian experience with debt conversions gained momentum
after the foreign exchange crisis in that country, which unfolded in
the Autumn of 1982. At that point in time the external debt indicators
for Brazil reflected the disruption in the international financial
system, and showed as well a nation whose reliance on debt-led growth
had brought about an unsustainable situation. In Table II-l the evo-
lution of some major debt indicators for the Brazilian economy through-
out the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s is provided. We can also
see the increasing share of commercial bank lending in the total medium
and long-term capital flows to Brazil. This latter pattern is not only
important for the understanding of the external difficulties in the
beginning of 1980s, but also for the understanding of the important
role played by commercial banks in motivating debt conversion proposals.
The conversion of debt into investment was not a qualitative inno-
vation for the Brazilian economy in 1982. In fact, the conversion
mechanism existed before; however, it was considered very much marginal
in volume. From 1978 to 1981 the annual average of conversions as a
percentage of total foreign investment (including loans and financing)
was around 5.9 percent (see Table III-l). There were no restrictions
for debt conversions before 1982. However, the inexistence of a secon-
dary market for LDC's debt implied the absence of market incentives for
conversions, i.e., the major incentive—discount—was not present. In
1982, fiscal incentives for debt conversion were enhanced with the
creation of a financial line of credit corresponding to 10 percent of
-10-
the value of principal and interest capitalized in the first semester
14
of 1983. This incentive was subsequently extended until the end of
1984. 15
This fiscal incentive, as well as the lack of restrictions regard-
ing the period of permanence required for the capital converted, helps
to explain a record volume of conversions in 1984 of US $745.6 million
(see Table II1-1). Nevertheless, from 1984 onwards the Brazilian '
authorities apparently realized that through debt conversion the
country was substituting debt conversions for traditional foreign in-
vestment (loan financing and direct investments). Still in Table
III-l, we can see that debt conversions, as a percentage of total
foreign investment, increased from 9.5 percent in 1982 to 60.3 percent
in 1984. Despite the rationale of the Brazilian government, one could
argue that debt conversions between 1982 and 1984 to some extent filled
the blank, left by voluntary lending and foreign direct investment.
Debt Conversion Setbacks in 1984
The pace in which the debt conversion was being carried on between
1982 and 1984 was interpreted by the Brazilian authorities not only as
being a disincentive to traditional foreign investment, but also as
jeopardizing the rescheduling agreements in 1983. In that year, under
the monitoring of the IMF, Brazil and its foreign creditors estab-
lished a four-point financial package. The first two points of this
package, the so-called Project I and Project II, were being threatened
by the increasing volume of conversions. The two projects were (1) a
"Jumbo-Loan" of US $4.4 billion to be provided by commercial banks in
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proportion to their outstanding credits to Brazil (Project I); and
(2) the rescheduling of medium and long-term principal payments to
commercial banks falling due in 1983, for a period of eight to nine
years (Project II).
The Brazilian policymakers' rationale was that through accelerated
debt conversions the commercial banks were reducing their degree of
exposure to Brazilian loans, and consequently affecting the volume of
rescue loans to be provided (Project I). Furthermore, the possibility
of immediate repatriation of converted credits made the agreements on
the rescheduling (Project II) seem vulnerable to creditors' pressures.
In order to slow down the unfolding consequences of the debt con-
version scheme, the Brazilian Central Bank severely restricted these
operations in 1984. Among the restrictions imposed on debt conver-
sions were (i ) debt conversion operations became restricted only to the
original holders of the Brazilian loans; (ii) the repatriation of con-
verted credits was allowed only if obeying the repayment schedule
assigned to the original credit; (iii) transference of converted cre-
dits ownership was not allowed during the minimum period of permanence
within the country; (iv) repatriation of any other investment pre-
viously made by the agent of conversion was not permitted during the
minimum period of permanence.
The restrictive measures undertaken in 1984 led to a significant
decline in the volume of conversions. This volume dropped from US
$745.6 million in 1984 to US $220 million in 1986 (see Table III-l).
Another consequence from the new attitude toward debt conversions was
a larger participation of commercial banks. While almost 83 percent
-12-
of Brazilian medium and long-term public debt was originally in hands
of private sources in 1982, mainly commercial banks, their share in
the conversions for the year of 1983 was no more than 8 percent of the
total. The other 92 percent converted in 1983 was due to Inter-
companies. After the Circular-Letter 1125-11/9/84, the international
banks lead the debt conversions in Brazil with 68 percent in 1985 and
84 percent in 1986. Table III-2 provides the breakdown of converted
credits, by object and agent, between 1983 and 1986. We can see in
this table the increasing participation of commercial banks in debt
conversion deals. Furthermore, it suggests that the debt conversions
in Brazil after 1984 were working mainly as a means for international
banks to recapitalize their branches within that country.
Prospects of Debt Conversion in Brazil
Only in late November 1987 Brazil's National Monetary Council
approved a new debt conversion program. The government policymakers
adopted a less restrictive posture aimed at helping debt conversions
to become an important source of attraction of foreign investment into
the country. Many Brazilian businesses, including subsidiaries of
multinational corporations, came to expect the new debt conversion
program to provide an essential source of finance in a country lacking
long-term funds at reasonable economic costs. The FIRCE (Central
Bank's Department of Foreign Capital Regulation and Supervision)
expects US $2 billion to be converted annually.
However, the achievement of foreign capital attraction will depend
crucially upon the economic and political prospects of the country.
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The recent evidence seems to endorse an optimistic attitude toward debt
1 8
conversions. In the economic sphere, after the failure of the
heterodox reform named the "Cruzado Plan," and the return to a stag-
flation scenario in 1987, the government is pushing toward more ortho-
dox macroeconoraic policies. The Brazilian government not only has
sought to reassure the international financial community and the IMF
by putting a halt on the debt moratorium in November 1987, but also is
committing itself to the adoption of more restrictive fiscal measures
to cut down the budget deficit.
IV. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF THE DEBT CONVERSION PROGRAM
The New Debt Conversion Program
The new Brazilian debt conversion program, approved in late
November 1987, was finally made official through the Central Bank,
resolution No. 1460 in February 1988. Under this new program, a total
sum of US $67.4 billion of the Brazilian foreign debt will be eligible
for conversion. A large portion of these credits—US $25 billion
—
will be made available under monthly auctions of US $150 million
19
each. The winning proposal will be the one which offers the largest
discount, i.e., the discount to be earned by the government over the
20
face value of the credit in domestic currency. This US $25 billion
covers bank loans that have already matured, i.e. , credits already
due, and respective interest charges which were still on deposit at
the Central Bank (see Regulations' Table under Brazilian eligible
debt). The remaining US $42.43 billion covers outstanding debt from
the private sector (US $10.13 billion) as well as outstanding debt
from the Brazilian public sector (US $32.3 billion).
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The investors eligible to convert Brazilian credits are non-
residents and foreign creditors. Differently from other countries,
such as Argentina, Chile and Mexico, the Brazilian program does not
allow residents to participate directly in the conversions. The
rationale for permitting residents to participate is the reversion of
capital flight. However, the Brazilian capital flight, compared to
other Latin American countries, has been fairly small (see Table
21
IV-1). Furthermore, the Brazilian government controls the foreign
exchange market, with the parallel (black.) market playing only a
marginal role. This implies that in principle the only Brazilian
residents with access to foreign exchange are exporters and importers.
Thus, the Brazilian policymakers argue that if importers and exporters
were allowed to participate in the debt conversion scheme, they would
be encouraged to overinvoice imports or underinvoice exports in order
to be able to purchase Brazilian foreign debt in the international
secondary market.
In sum, the non direct participation of Brazilian residents in
debt conversion seems to be an adequate regulatory measure. Note that
the residents are going to participate not only by intermediating
debt-equity operations, but also they would take advantage of the
available medium and long-term funds. This latter benefit mainly
arises with the participation of foreign capital conversion funds in
the Brazilian stock market.
The credits converted in Brazil through the new program must
remain in the country for a period of 12 years from the date of capi-
talization. The schedule of remittance of profits and dividends in
-15-
the initial four years will be subject to the balance of payments
situation.
The Impact on the Brazilian Stock Market
The Brazilian stock market, Latin America's largest market in
terms of market capitalization, is in a position to benefit from the
new conversion program. The program permits the conversion of foreign
debt to acquire equity securities on Brazil's stock exchanges. The
foreign investors, however, are not allowed to participate directly in
the market—their participation will be through the foreign capital
conversion funds. These funds may be managed by national investment
banks, or international banks with branches or affiliates within the
22
country.
Furthermore, the new debt conversion program represents an attrac-
tive alternative for the foreign investor willing to participate in
the Brazilian capital market. The renewed interest of international
investors in the Brazilian market in the last couple of years, despite
the political and economic instability of that nation, is related to
the increasing supervision of the markets, the better information
systems, as well as the fact that most of the stocks are presenting
low P/E ratios.
The Denationalization Impact
Debt conversions, taken as a serious alternative for the Brazilian
external debt problem, present some political problems. This con-
straint emerges mainly from the potential denationalization impact.
The stock of foreign direct investment in Brazil amounted to US $27.9
-16-
billion in December 1986 (see Table IV-2). In a nation with an esti-
mated external debt of US $130 billion at year-end 1987, and a total
amount eligible for conversion of US $67.4 billion, the very success
of the debt conversion strategy would represent a substantial increase
in foreign ownership of local businesses. Even with the retirement of
the eligible debt, this might imply a more than 100 percent increase
in the stock of foreign investment in Brazil.
As a measure to appease the sectors of society concerned with this
potential denationalization impact, the Brazilian program sets limits
for the participation of foreign capital conversion funds. These
funds may not hold more than 5 percent of the voting capital or more
than 20 percent of the total capital of any one company. The invest-
ment opportunities outside the stock market are restricted to the
following categories: new subsidiaries of multinational corporations;
new companies of mixed capital (joint ventures— 51 percent national
capital); development of new projects and expansion of existing ones.
Besides that, the participation of foreign capital is not allowed in
areas considered of national security and economic strategy (i.e.,
broadcasting, information management, etc.).
The purpose of the Brazilian program is to foster direct invest-
ment, essentially by attracting foreign capital, but at the same time
to restrict or avoid the substitution of existing national capital.
Albeit the endeavor of the Brazilian authorities is to reduce the
potential denationalization impact, this will still constitute a deli-
cate political issue in the years ahead.
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The Impact on Inflation and Interest Rates
One of the key constraints of the debt conversion strategy refers
to its possible inflationary impact. The debt conversions themselves
are inflationary only to the extent that the Central Bank converts
dollar denominated debt into domestic currency, which automatically
increases the monetary base. However, this expansion of the monetary
base might not necessarily take place. In order to analyze the impact
of debt conversions upon the monetary base, it is important to recog-
nize the different sort of operations that can occur.
For example, consider the direct conversion, in which the original
creditor converts its credit into equity investment in the original
debtor company. In this case there is no increase in the monetary
base. It rather represents a recomposition of the company's capital
structure. Even when the investor is a third party, there might be no
increase in the monetary base. This will be the case if the debt is
not public or publicly guaranteed by the government, and the foreign
investor deals directly with the private original debtor. In this
case, the dollar denominated debt is automatically converted into
23
equity participation without the intermediation of the government.
The inflationary problem arises when the debt is held by the
government, i.e., the debt conversion will entail the issuance of
local currency. The Brazilian oublic or publicly guaranteed external
debt represented 81.1 percent of the total medium and long-term debt
in 1985 (see Table IV-3), a participation wh_ch has increased over
the last two years.
-18-
The local government can follow basically three strategies in
order to convert its own external debt: (i) the Central Bank converts
the dollar denominated debt into local currency for the foreign in-
vestor to proceed with the investment—this results in automatic mone-
tary expansion; (ii) the Central Bank redeems the foreign debt into
domestic debt; (iii) the Central Bank follows a mixed strategy of (i
)
and (ii).
The potential inflationary impact of the first strategy is straight'
forward. Assuming output and money velocity constant in the short-
run, an increase in the monetary base, followed by an increase in the
money supply, implies a higher level of prices. It can be argued,
though, that even in the short-run the inflationary impact can be off-
set by a restrictive monetary policy such as increasing bank reserve
requirements or working through open market operations.
The second strategy represents an exchange of domestic debt for
external debt. In principle, it has no impact on the monetary base.
However, it may still be inflationary, due to the possible crowding
out the domestic market, which would help to push up the local
interest rates. This follows from the additional pressure exerted on
the domestic deficit.
In the Brazilian case, the adoption of strategy (i) would have
immediate inflationary impact. In a country with a three digit rate
of inflation (366 percent in 1987), where the financial assets are
24
highly indexed, and where just the monetary correction of the out-
standing domestic debt was 12 percent of the GDP in 1984, there is
only a very small margin of maneuver for the government to sterilize
-19-
the monetary impact through open-market operations (see Table IV-4).
However, there is still room for a restrictive monetary policy through
the increase of bank reserve requirements.
The entire redemption of converted external debt into domestic
debt has its potential disadvantages. In Brazil, it would represent
a loss for the country, since the real rate of interest on the local
currency bonds is much higher than the interest rate paid on the
foreign debt. In Table IV-5 is shown that the real domestic interest
rate is more than 2.5 times the average real interest rates on the
external debt, in 1985. In sum, if that country follows only strategy
(ii) it would exchange expensive domestic debt for relatively cheaper
external debt. Furthermore, given the high liquidity of government
securities in Brazil, the inflationary pressure would still be present.
This stems from the fact that the larger the volume of highly liquid
government bonds in the hands of the public, the larger the total
credit available in the economy.
On the other hand, the strongest argument in favor of the limited
inflationary impact of debt conversion in Brazil is represented by its
relatively small size within the Brazilian economy.
The Impact on the Exchange Rate
Theoretically the debt conversion scheme can exert two opposite
impacts on the exchange rate. For example, if the debt conversions
reach significant levels, the required monetary expansion and conse-
quent inflationary pressures will tend to imply pressures for currency
depreciation. On the other hand, the increased demand for domestic
-20-
assets, as well as the improvement of the country's external indica-
tors, will work toward a currency appreciation.
Assuming that the Brazilian authorities keep pursuing a purchasing
power parity strategy, the debt conversion program should not have any
effect on the real exchange rate. At the same time, given the restric-
tive margin of maneuver for the Brazilian authorities to sterilize the
monetary impact of debt conversions, the end result will be a faster
rate of depreciation on the nominal exchange rate to keep it in line
with the higher rate of inflation.
There is, however, an implicit incentive to keep the domestic
currency overvalued, or not to pursue purchasing power parity. The
reason is that an overvalued real exchange rate permits the country to
retire a larger amount of its foreign debt with a lesser monetary
impact. In this case, the result would be an appreciation on the real
exchange rate with either a fixed nominal exchange rate or, more
likely, a depreciation on the nominal exchange rate lagging behind the
increase in the domestic price level.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis undertaken by this study suggests that, based upon
the Brazilian experience, the debt conversion strategy cannot be con-
sidered as a panacea for the foreign debt problem which plagues many
Third World countries. In the Brazilian case, the level of conversions
required to solve the foreign debt problem would exert undesirable
impacts on the economy such as a substantial increase in foreign owner-
ship of domestic businesses as well as strong inflationary pressures.
-21-
However, given the level of indebtedness of countries like Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina, as well as the less than successful alternatives
provided by the international financial system to deal with the debt
problem, the debt conversion strategies turn out to be one more instru-
ment to ameliorate the external debt plight of such nations.
In the case of Brazil, it is important to emphasize that although
the debt conversion strategy, considered in isolation, will have a
relatively small impact on the debt problem, it can be regarded as an
important means of attracting medium and long-term funds at reasonable
economic costs.
-22-
ENDNQTES
The conference was held at The City University, London, in
October 1983. Among its participants were central bankers from South
America, Europe and U.S., Euromarket leaders and economists from
around the world. See Res and Motamens (1984).
2
The association of commercial bank loans to floating interest
rates, in a world of volatile inflation and interest rates, might
explain the high degree of vulnerability achieved by borrowers in the
late 1970s. The debt at floating interest rates as a proportion of
the total public and publicly guaranteed debt for developing countries
changed from 6.4 percent in 1973 to 20.2 percent in 1982. The vari-
ance of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—three months, for
the same period was around 11.94 points. See World Bank Report
(1985).
3
The banks' exposure is compared to the banks' capital base. We
should note that although the exposure is relatively large with respect
to the capital base, it is a modest share of total bank loans. This
difference stems from the high leverage of banks, which have assets
worth as much as 20 times their capital. See Cline (1984), pp. 21-36.
4
Since that "black September" in 1982, more than 20 countries have
rescheduled their debts. Among them are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Mexico, Peru, Romania, Turkey, Costa Rica, etc. See World Bank Report
(1985), p. 79.
5
Allan Meltzer recalls the following: "Mismanagement was not con-
fined to local bureaucracies. The policies of the International Mone-
tary Fund spread the debt problem from one country to another by
imposing rules of adjustment that make little sense when applied to
many countries." He referred to the degree of interdependence among
the LDCs , especially in Latin America. Imposing restrictions to
Mexico's imports might seriously harm Brazil's exports, and vice-versa.
See Res and Motamens (1984), p. 24.
These charges are represented by explicit discounts and trans-
action costs, as well as an implicit discount through a less favorable
exchange rate. There is no standardized procedure undertaken by the
local governments, rather each deal carries its own peculiarities.
The idea of a "subsidy" stems from the fact that for the foreign in-
vestor what matters is neither the size of the original discount
(secondary market), nor the discount earned by the local government.
He will rather consider the net discount at which he will obtain local
currency.
Debt Conversion is a more appropriate term for the operation in-
volving a swap of discounted debt into local currency. This is due to
the fact that such operation can take place not only for foreign direct
-23-
investment purposes, but also for more general purposes by residents
and non-residents of the borrower countries. In the present paper both
terms are used to represent the same phenomenon.
o
These deals included: debt for debt swaps; debt for equity swaps;
selling for a mixture of debt and cash; and debt for commodity swaps.
9
Among the changes in Regulation K of the Bank Holding Act,
announced by the Federal Reserve in August 1987, was one allowing the
banks to acquire as much as 100 percent of non-financial companies in
33 heavily indebted countries, provided that the companies are being
privatized. However, one crucial restriction has not been removed.
This is related to the maximum period allowed for the disposition of
equity interest contracted abroad which is fixed in five years, while
most of countries require the banks to hold the investment for at
least 10 years. See American Banker , August 1987.
10
See Jed Horowitz, "Obstacles seen despite easing curbs on debt
swaps," in American Banker , v. 152, August 14, 1987, p. 2(1).
Some analysts believe that this movement was in part precipitated
by the Brazilian moratorium declared in February 20, 1987. As Jeffrey
Sachs stated, "Brazil's moratorium did produce one good result: it did
finally provoke a serious view of what was going on. The commercial
banks, with Citicorp in the lead, took a step ahead of the Treasury and
of the Federal Reserve, by making provisions for loan losses against
LDC debt." See "The Debt Crisis at a Turning Point," in Challenge , May-
June 1988.
12
The total commercial bank lending to the world's 15 most indebted
countries is around $400 billion. The top 15 U.S. banks have a 17.5
percent slice of that—about US $70 billion.
13
See Debt Conversion Regulations ' Table for additional information
concerning the Brazilian, Mexican and Chilean programs.
1 Central Bank Decree Law No. 1994—December 29, 1982.
Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 316.
For detailed analysis, see Batista in World Bank Discussion
Papers #7
, pp. 43-44.
The restriction was implemented through the Circular Letter of
FIRCE (Central Bank's Department of Foreign Capital Supervision and
Registration) No. 1125-11/9/1984.
18
Nevertheless, some facts suggest caution. Brazil's Constituent
Assembly recently passed protectionist draft resolutions which might
limit the foreign participation in the following sectors: mining,
shipping and oil drilling (prohibiting risk contracts between the
-24-
Brazilian monopoly—PETROBRAS—and the foreign companies). The impact
of such resolutions might increase the reluctance of foreign investors
to channel new funds to the Brazilian economy. See The Economist
,
May 7, 1988, p. 66.
19
The auctions are regulated and supervised by the CVM (the
Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission). Half of the volume in auction
is linked to investments in the Brazilian stock market, and the other
half to projects to be developed in priority areas in the North and
Northeast of Brazil, under supervision of regional agencies (SUDAM and
SUDENE).
20
Note that this is different from the discount earned by the
foreign investor when he purchases the Brazilian debt in the secondary
market.
21
The reasons for that fact can be listed as follows: (i) main-
tenance of purchasing power parity through minidevaluation schemes;
(ii) comprehensive indexation of financial markets, which eliminate
inflation risk; (iii) maintenance of domestic real interest rates over
20 percent, well above international interest rates.
22
The recent proposals received by the Brazilian Securities Com-
mission (CVM) for the formation of such funds include the ones from
Merrill Lynch (US $100 million), Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (US
$50 million), Banco Montreal Investimento, a Brazilian affiliate of
that Canadian bank (US $100 million); and Banco Bozano Simonsen (US
$100 million).
23
Note that the intermediation is referred to in terms of changing
the monetary base or of issuing domestic debt. However, in terms of
regulation, the deal still requires the approval of competent authori-
ties (in Brazil: FIRCE and CVM).
24
"In 1985 the domestic debt of the non financial public sector
represented 57 percent of the total gross financial assets outstanding.
See Martone (1987), p. 33.
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Table II-l
Debt Indicators for Brazil - selected years
(ratio in percent, amount in billion dollars)
1970 1974 1978 1982 1983
Ratio Debt/GDP 9.6 11.4 15.2 23.5 37.0
Ratio Debt/Exports 150.0 149.6 249.8 328.1 350.5
Debt Service/Exports 33.1 32.3 63.4 90.7 85.3
Total Debt 3 4.1 11.9 31.6 66.2 79.7
Private Debt/Total b 42.0 68.4 80.5 82.8 81.5
Debt at floating
interest rates/Total 16.5* 43.2 56.3 70.2 75.2
Medium and long-term outstanding debt at the end of the year.
Note: considered net debt (gross debt minus gross reserves of mone-
tary authorities). Includes private nonguaranteed external debt.
Debt from financial institutions and other private sources.
Figure for 1971.
Source
:
World Bank Report and Banco Central do Brasil.
Table II-2
Exposure of U.S. banks relative to capital base
(percentage, end year)
1977 1979 1981 1982 Value 1982*
All banks
East. Europe 16.7 16.1 12.9 8.9 6,278
Nonoil LDCs 114.9 124.2 148.3 146.1 103,181
Sum 131.6 140.3 163.5 155.0 109,459
Mexico 27.4 23.0 34.3 34.5 24,377
Brazil 29.4 27.3 26.9 28.9 20,438
Largest nine
East. Europe 25.0 23.9 19.5 13.9 4,045
Nonoil LDCs 163.2 182.1 220.6 221.2 64,149
Sum 188.2 206.0 240.1 235.2 68,194
Mexico 32.9 29.6 44.4 44.4 12,262
Brazil 41.9 40.3 40.8 45.8 13,296
*Values are given in US $ million.
Source : Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System; Country Exposure
Lending Survey, various issues.
Table II-3
Market Prices for Developing Countries Debt
(as a percentage of face value)
1985 1986 in quarters 1987 in quarters
Country
July I II III IV I II III IV*
Argentina 62.5 65 65 65 65 63 58.2 43.5 35.5
Brazil 78 75 74.5 75 76 72 63 51 38
Chile 67 66.5 66 66 66.5 67 68.5 63.2 51.5
Colombia 82 81 81 81.5 — 87.5 87 81.5 75.5
Ecuador 67.5 70 66 64.5 59.5 63.5 53 40 32.5
Mexico 81 67.5 58.5 57 55.5 56.5 57.5 52 49
Peru 47.5 25.5 21.5 19 18.5 17.5 16 8.5 4.5
Philipp. 74 74 71 67.2 58.5
Poland 57.5 51.5 47 43.5 42.7 41.7 44 43 41.5
Romania 87 91.5 91 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 86.5
Venezuela 82 80.5 77 75.5 73.5 73 72.5 64 51.5
Yugoslavia 76.5 79.5 78.5 76.5 79 77 77 70 58.5
Note: Figures represent linear average between minimum quotation in the
first month and maximum in the third month.
*Excludes December 1987.
Source: Shearson Lehman Brothers.
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Table III-2
Breakdown of Debt Converted in Brazil
by Object and Agent - 1982 to 1986
(in thousands of dollars)
Foreign Inter-
Private national
1983 Entities Banks
1) Principal
from loans 576,449 65,075
2) Interest
from loans 25,823 1,233
3) Principal
from financing 196,745 218
4) Interest
from financing 2,390 23
Government
Agencies Others Total
1,175 74 642,773
—
— 27,056
481 197,444
2,413
TOTAL 801,407 66,549 1,175 555 869,686
1984
1) 387,033 67,732 — — 454,765
2) 7,108 16 -- — 7,124
3) 85,291 — -- 88 85,379
4) 3,260 — -- — 3,260
TOTAL 482,692 67,748 — 88 550,528
1985
1) 33,548 121,465 — — 155,013
2) 1,042 — — — 1,042
3) 22,738 274 — 45 23,057
4) 665 — — — 665
TOTAL 57,993 121,739 -- 45 179,777
1986
1) 1,730 10,726 — — 12,456
2) 373 10 — — 383
TOTAL 2,103 10,736 — — 12,839
Source: Report RINV 904 DIBAP/SEPRO Central Bank of Brazil.
Table IV-1
Capital Flight and Gross Capital Inflows
in Selected Countries, 1979-82
(values in billion dollars, rati"1 in %)
(A) Ca p i t a 1 (B) Gross Capital (A)/(B)
Country Flight 3 inflow b
Venezuela 22.0 16.1 136.6
Argentina 19.2 29.5 65.1
Mexico 26.5 55.4 47.8
Uruguay 0.6 2.2 27.3
Portugal 1.8 8.6 20.9
Brazil 3.5 43.9 8.0
Turkey 0.4 7.9 5.1
Korea 0.9 18.7 4.8
Figures are estimated by The World Bank. Capital Flight is
defined as the sum of gross capital inflows and current account
deficit, less increase in reserves.
Defined as the sum of changes in gross foreign debt (public and
private) and net foreign direct investment.
Source: World Bank Data. See World Development Report 1985, p. 64.
Table IV-2
Direct Foreign Investment and Reinvestment
Registered in Brazil 3
(in billion dollars)
Period Investment Reinvestment Total b
Dec 83 15.40 6.75 22.30
Jun 84 16.14 6.71 22.85
Dec 84 16.34 6.50 22.84
Jun 85 16.82 6.87 23.68
Dec 85 17.92 7.74 25.66
Jun 86 18.67 8.34 27.05
Dec 86 19.18 8.71 27.89
Stock of foreign investment registered at the
Brazilian Central Bank at the end of the period.
b
Numbers may not add because rounding.
Source: Banco Central do Brasil.
Table IV-3
Brazilian Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt, 1980-85
(in billion dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Total External Debt 70.2 79.9 91.4 97.8 103.5 106.7
Medium & long-term 56.7 64.6 73.3 81.0 87.8 91.1
Public & Publicly G. 40.1 44.8 50.2 59.5 68.5 73.9
Private non guarant. 16.6 19.8 23.1 21.5 19.3 17.2
Use of IMF credit 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.6 4.2 4.6
Short Term Debt 13.5 15.3 17.4 14.2 11.5 11.0
Source: IBRD/DRS - World Bank data.
Table IV-4
Brazil - Consolidated Accounts of the Federal Government
(in billions of cruzados)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
3.67 7.65 16.17 38.09 114.75
3.11 6.04 12.77 29.39 84.24
0.56 1.61 3.40 8.70 30.51
3.93 8.42 17.92 42.44 135.14
3.70 7.87 16.26 37.49 110.89
(A) Total Receipts
Tax Revenues
Others
(B) Total Expenditures
Operational
Interest Payment
and Monetary
Correction3 0.23 0.55 1.66 4.95 24.25
(C) Overall Balance
(C=A-B) -0.26 -0.77 -1.75 -4.35 -20.39
(D) Non-f inancial
Overall Balance
(D=C excluding
Inter, and M.C.) -0.03 -0.22 -0.09 0.60 3.86
1.058 3.16 10.56 46.59
4.1 6.2 8.8 12.0
Monetary Correction
on Domestic Debt
(as a % of GDP)
a
Includes only monetary correction on indexed bonds (ORTNs) that
was actually paid in the period.
Sources : Getulio Vargas Foundation and Ministry of Finance.
Table IV-5
Interest Rates on Foreign and Domestic Public Debt
(in percentage)
Domestic Interest Rates
Deflated by GPI/DI - CDBs a
Average Real Interest
Rates on MLT Debt b
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
-10.0
-2.5
4.9
29.8
-3.7
23.7
26.1
-3.2
-3.1
3.2
10.9
8.4
6.0
9.7
CDBs stands for Brazilian Certificates of Deposit.
Interest paid on medium and long-term debt/outstanding medium and
long-term debt, in real terms.
Source : Central Bank of Brazil, Conjuntura Economica and World Bank
Calculations.
DEBT CONVERSION REGULATIONS TABLE
Country Legislation Eligible Debt
Eligible
Investors
Mexico
May 1986.
Clause 5.11 New
money agreements
and restructure
agreements.
Brazil
Direct debt of United
States of Mexico (a)
under new money agree-
ments (b) under re-
structure agreements.
Holders of
debt and non-
resident
entities and
individuals.
Central Bank
resolution No. 1460
effective on Nov 11/87,
Chile
Credits covered by
rescheduling agree-
ments of the Brazilian
Foreign Debt.
Non-residents
foreign
creditors and
investors.
Decree Law 600 (Foreign
Investment Statute)
Chapter 14 (Compendium
of Foreign Exchange
Regulations of the
Banco Central de Chile).
Chapters 18, and 19.
Foreign currency de-
nominated paper, in
hands of creditors with
maturity greater than 1
year. All debts eligible
except for a) official
credits; b) loans from
multilateral organiza-
tions; c) loans with less
than one year to maturity,
Non-residents
and residents
Source : Based on information published by Trade Finance, Sept. 1987.
Updated in April 1988 for Brazil.
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